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 1 
Summary  
The jurisdictional immunity of states in cases concerning serious human 
rights violations has been extensively discussed in the international legal 
debate and has given rise to conflicting judicial decisions by courts of 
various jurisdictions. While serious human rights violations constitute 
breaches of peremptory norms, jus cogens, from which no derogation is 
permitted, the law of state immunity is said to constitute a procedural bar to 
the exercise of jurisdiction by national courts. The conflict between state 
immunity and jus cogens was brought to a head in the 2012 judgement of 
the International Court of Justice “Jurisdictional Immunities of the State 
(Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening)”. From the outset of this judgement, 
the purpose of this paper is to examine the balance in international law 
between state immunity and serious human right violations of jus cogens 
status. While the International Court of Justice concluded that customary 
international law has not yet developed to the point where a state is not 
entitled to immunity in case of serious violations of human rights law or the 
law of armed conflict, this conclusion has been contested by national courts 
and legal scholars. While this paper agrees with the outcome of the 
judgement, it does not fully agree with the arguments and reasoning of the 
court. According to this paper, the balance between state immunity and jus 
cogens may not yet be finally settled. 
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Sammanfattning  
Staters immunitet i fall som rör grova kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter 
har blivit flitigt omdiskuterad i den folkrättsliga debatten, och har gett 
upphov till motstridiga domar bland olika nationella domstolar. Medan 
grova kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter utgör brott mot tvingande 
folkrättsliga regler, jus cogens, från vilka inga avsteg är tillåtna, så utgör 
reglerna om statsimmunitet ett processuellt hinder mot jurisdiktionsutövning 
av nationella domstolar. Konflikten mellan statsimmunitet och jus cogens 
fördes till sin spets i den Internationella domstolens (ICJ’s) avgörande från 
2012 “Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece 
intervening)”. Med utgångspunkt i detta avgörande, syftar denna uppsats till 
att undersöka balansen i internationell rätt mellan statsimmunitet och grova 
kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter av jus cogens status. Medan ICJ kom 
fram till att internationell sedvanerätt inte ännu har utvecklat ett undantag 
till statsimmuniteten för grova människorättskränkningar eller brott mot den 
internationella humanitära rätten, så har denna slutsats ifrågasatts av 
nationella domstolar och i den juridiska doktrinen. Medan denna uppsats 
håller med om slutsatsen i domen, så ifrågasätter den vissa av domstolens 
bakomliggande argument. Enligt denna uppsats är det inte säkert att 
balansen mellan statsimmunitet och jus cogens är fullständigt avgjord.  
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Abbreviations  
CC 
 
ECHR 
 
 
EU Convention 
 
ICJ 
 
ICJ Statute 
 
ILC 
 
ILC Articles 
 
 
UN 
 
UN Convention  
 
 
Italian Constitutional Court 
 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms 
 
European Convention on State Immunity 
 
International Court of Justice 
 
Statute of the International Court of Justice 
 
International Law Commission 
 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for                                                  
Internationally Wrongful Acts 
 
United Nations                                    
 
United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and their Property Juris 
Convention of Immunities  
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1  Introduction    
1.1  Background    
The jurisdictional immunity of foreign states before national courts in cases 
concerning serious human rights violations or humanitarian law has been 
extensively debated in recent years in scholarly literature and has given rise 
to conflicting judicial decisions by courts of various jurisdictions. The 
conflict is brought to a head in cases concerning the gravest breaches of 
international law. On the one hand, such crimes constitute breaches of 
peremptory norms, jus cogens, from which no derogation is permitted. But 
on the other hand, the law of state immunity is said to constitute a 
procedural bar to the exercise of jurisdiction by national courts, which 
means that the court must dismiss the case, regardless of the nature of the 
allegations against the state. Because of the procedural nature of the rule of 
state immunity, there is also a tension between state immunity and the 
fundamental right of access to justice. In cases regarding serious human 
right violations, (such as massacres, slavery and torture), the access to a 
court can be crucial for the victims in order to gain redress. Thus, certain 
international lawyers argue that there should be an exception from state 
immunity, in cases concerning the gravest breaches of human rights, namely 
those of jus cogens status. In the recent years, the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) judgement “Jurisdictional Immunities of the State” (Germany 
vs. Italy)1 concerning this very topic, have been particularly debated. After 
this case was published, several international legal scholars and practitioners 
have held that it was now safe to say that state immunity, as a principle of 
international law, is protecting states from prosecution for breaches of jus 
cogens norms. However, in 2014, this conclusion was contested by the 
Italian Constitutional Court. In its decision no. 2382, the Constitutional 
                                               
1 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 99, [hereinafter Germany vs. Italy] 
2 Judgment no. 238, 2014. 
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Court refused to give effect to the ICJ’s judgement. This certainly re-opens 
the debate about whether the ICJ accomplished an appropriate balance 
between the rule of state immunity on the one hand and human rights of jus 
cogens status on the other hand. 
 
1.2  Purpose  and  Questions  
The purpose of this paper aims to investigate and problematize the balance 
between state immunity and jus cogens norms in public international law. 
The ambition is to explore how this balance has been developed in 
international law, with the main focus on the implications of Germany vs. 
Italy, and to give an account of the different arguments put forward in the 
debate. In order to fulfill this purpose, the paper will (try to) answer the 
following questions:  
 
1.   How are the rules of state immunity and the rules of human rights of 
jus cogens status being balanced in international law? 
 
2.   Which are the arguments behind this balance? 
  
1.3  Limitations  
Public international law generally separate immunity into two systems, state 
immunity (depending on the protection of an action or property) and 
personal immunity (depending on the protection of a certain person or that 
person’s property).3 This paper will solely focus on the former type of 
immunity, i.e. state immunity. As states cannot be found criminally liable, 
the examination concern immunity from civil claims,4 and the examination 
therefore does not include judgments from international criminal courts.  
                                               
3 Linderfalk, 2012, p. 52. 
4 Lebeck, 2001 4, p.892, 895, Henriksen, 2017, p. 102. 
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Special attention will be dedicated the ICJ judgement Germany vs. Italy, as 
it is the most recent and evident ruling concerning the balance between state 
immunity and jus cogens norms, and since it recapitulates the last decades 
debate on the topic. The final parts of the judgement focus on jurisdiction 
from enforcement, as well as the measures of constraints taken against 
property. As this paper is focusing on adjudicative immunity in relation to 
jus cogens, these issues will not be examined. The same applies for 
arguments put forward not relating to the balance between state immunity 
and human rights rules of jus cogens status.  
 
1.4  Method  and  Perspective  
In order to pursue the purpose and answer the questions in this essay, the 
traditional judicial method have been employed. This method is applied in 
order to identify the established law and the current legal position, through 
the application of the generally accepted sources of law. Hence, the answers 
will be sought in legislation, preparatory works, and the legal doctrine.5 
Furthermore, this paper will apply a comparative international perspective 
by comparing the different interpretations of national and international 
courts of the concept of state immunity. The comparative perspective will 
hopefully be effective while identifying different arguments behind the 
balance between state immunity and jus cogens. 
 
1.5  Research  contribution  
The conflict between jus cogens and the rule of state immunity have been 
generously debated among several scholars, for example by Lee Caplan, 
Mathias Reimann, and Andrea Bianchi.6 While Caplan have criticized the 
                                               
5 Korling and Zamboni, 2013, p. 21.  
6 See for ex. Caplan 2003, Reimann 1995, Bianchi 1999, which will be discussed more 
thoroughly in section 2.3 and 4.2. 
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normative theory, according to which state immunity is void when serious 
human rights violations of jus cogens norms are concerned, Reimann and 
Bianchi represent views of the opposite opinion. The implications of the 
reactions from the Italian Constitutional Court after Germany vs. Italy on 
the balance between jus cogens and state immunity have been discussed by 
De Sena.7   
 
1.6  Material  
In accordance with the traditional juridical method, the material essentially 
consists of the traditional sources of public international law; international 
conventions and treaties, international customary law, general principles of 
law, judicial decisions and jurisprudence. 8 Except for two conventions from 
the Council of Europe and the United Nations (UN), the law of state 
immunity is mainly based on customary international law,9 which relating to 
state immunity have primarily been developed through national legislation 
and judgements of national courts. 10 Additionally, judicial decisions from 
international and regional courts will be examined. Even though they 
constitute a submissive source of international law according to article 38 in 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ statute), they provide a 
useful illustration of the current provisions of international law.11 In order to 
facilitate the study of the international customary law of state immunity, 
jurisprudence of well-established scholars and acknowledged textbook 
authors have been employed. 
 
                                               
7 De Sena, 2016. 
8 Art. 38 (1) Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ statute). 
9 Linderfalk, 2012, p. 53. 
10 Fox, 2008, pp. 20–25. 
11 Henriksen, 2017, p.31. 
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1.7  Disposition  
The initial part of this paper is followed by three descriptive segments. 
Segment two examines the rules of state immunity. Segment three outlines 
the relevant aspects of the ICJ’s judgement Germany vs. Italy, relating to the 
purpose and questions of the paper. Segment four studies some criticism of 
the majority’s opinion in the judgment. The paper will then be concluded 
with an analysis in segment five, intended to answer the questions posed in 
the introduction.   
 
 9 
2  State  immunity  
2.1  From  The  Absolute  Doctrine  to  
Restrictive  Immunity  
Let us begin with a brief historical background, in order to gain a better 
understanding of the concept of state immunity. The modern rule of state 
immunity from foreign jurisdiction is generally considered to derive from 
the early nineteenth century and the Latin maxim par in parem non habet 
imperium (an equal has no authority over another equal).12 This maxim 
essentially refers to the principle of sovereign equality,13 one of the 
fundamental pillars of the international legal order, according to which all 
states are equally sovereign and thus have no right to exercise jurisdiction 
against each other.14 The principle was considerably present in one of the 
first judgements expressing the rule of foreign state immunity; the Schooner 
Exchange vs. McFaddon15 from 1812. The Schooner Exchange has had big 
influence on the law of state immunity since it was one of the first cases 
confirming that states should be protected from foreign jurisdiction.16 The 
case have become renowned, partly because of the Chief Justice Marshall’s 
explanation of the rationale of state immunity:  
 
“One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another, and being bound by obligations of 
the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by placing himself or its 
sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter a sovereign 
territory only under an express license, or in the confidence that the immunities belonging 
to his independent sovereign status, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by 
implication, and will be extended to him.” 17 
 
                                               
12 Crawford, 2012, p. 488.  
13 For example, expressed in article 2(1), Charter of the United Nations. 
14 Germany vs. Italy, para 57. 
15 The Schooner Exchange vs. McFaddon, 1812. 
16 Van Alebeek, 2012, p.12. 
17 Ibid, p.137. 
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The perspective on state immunity expressed in the Schooner Exchange, is 
representing what is known as “the absolute doctrine” (or absolute 
immunity), according to which, national courts were completely barred from 
bringing legal claims against foreign states.18 However, the weight of the 
absolute doctrine can be questioned. As is showed by Alebeek, courts in 
Italy and Belgium rejected the absolute doctrine as early as the nineteenth 
century and several other states followed shortly thereafter.19 This practice 
eventually led towards tendencies of a more restrictive immunity. One way 
to explain this shift, was that states were getting increasingly involved in 
border crossing commercial activities, creating a need to protect private 
companies' rights vis-à-vis states.20 This development led to a more nuanced 
approach to state immunity among different national courts, 21 and after the 
Second World War, the idea that states under certain circumstances could be 
subjected to foreign jurisdiction was introduced. 22 The 1950 Austrian case 
Dralle vs. Republic of Czechoslovakia is commonly viewed as the 
breakthrough of the new “restrictive era”. In this case, the Austrian Supreme 
Court found that a foreign state could only be protected from Austrian 
jurisdiction for acts of a sovereign character. 23 A few years later, in the 
1963 Claim Against the Empire of Iran Case, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court held that absolute immunity was no longer a rule of 
customary international law. In the same case, the court also presented a 
distinction between sovereign acts (jure imperii) and non-sovereign acts 
(jure gestionis).24  
 
                                               
18 Ekpo, 2017, p.153. 
19 Alebeek, 2012, p.14-15. 
20 Sebis, 2016, p. 171.  
21 Alebeek, 2012, p.17. 
22 Henriksen, 2017, p. 105. 
23 Henriksen, 2017, p.105. 
24 Henriksen, 2017, p.105.  
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2.2  Current  Provisions  of  State  Immunity  
Today, it is widely accepted that jure gestionis acts are exempt from state 
immunity and therefore subject to foreign jurisdiction. 25 This restrictive 
immunity has become an established concept in treaty law, such as in the 
European Convention on State Immunity26 (EU Convention), which by 
December 2017 only have been ratified by eight states27, and more 
importantly, the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of 
States and their Property28 (UN Convention). Even though the latter one has 
not yet entered into force, it was prepared by the International Law 
Commission (ILC) and is of great relevance as it largely reflects customary 
international law. The ICJ’s analysis of the rule of state immunity in 
customary international law has led to the conclusion that  
“[…] practice shows that, whether in claiming immunity for themselves or according it to 
others, States generally proceed on the basis that there is a right to immunity under 
international law, together with a corresponding obligation on the part of other States to 
respect and give effect to that immunity.” 29 
As was mentioned in the section above, the restrictive concept of state 
immunity only protects the state from foreign jurisdiction in relation to 
sovereign acts (jure imperii). However, there is no existing rule in 
customary international law regulating the qualification of these acts, and it 
is thus up the states themselves to regulate this matter the way they see fit.30 
While the ICJ has provided no guidance on how to conduct this 
qualification, it has explained that “jure imperii” and “jure gestionis” does 
not say anything about the lawfulness of an action. Rather, it refers to 
whether an act fall under the law governing the exercise of sovereign power 
(jus imperii), or the law concerning non-sovereign activities of a state (jus 
                                               
25 Karajewski and Singer, 2012, p. 8. 
26 Adopted by the Council of Europe in 1972 and entered into force in 1976. 
27 States that have ratified: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom. 
28 Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 2 December 2004. Not yet in 
force.  
29 Germany vs. Italy, para 56. 
30 Linderfalk, 2012, p. 54. 
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gestionis). Moreover, the ICJ has affirmed that a domestic court has to 
decide the nature of the act before it can exercise its jurisdiction. This means 
that the court first has to determine whether the act is imperii or gestionis, 
and then, if the act is gestionis, move on to assess whether the act is legal or 
illegal. 31 
The UN Convention and the EU Convention also confirms that there are 
exceptions to state immunity. Even if the main rule is that a state enjoys 
immunity in respect of itself and its property in relation to foreign states,32 
this is not a definite rule. For example, the conventions permit departures 
from the immunity in proceedings which relates to pecuniary compensation 
for personal death or injury and damage to property.33 This exception is in 
principle only applicable on jure gestionis acts.34 
To summarize, state immunity is a rule that enable states35 and state 
representatives36 to perform public functions without being sued or 
prosecuted in foreign courts. It is preventing foreign courts from exercising 
adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction in cases where a state is a party. 37 
As it is a procedural rule it must be dealt with before an investigation of the 
merits of the case.38 The next section will discuss the relationship between 
state immunity and jus cogens norms. 
 
                                               
31 Germany vs Italy, para 60. 
32 UN convention, art 5. 
33 Art 12, UN Convention, art 11, EU Convention. 
34 See discussion about “the territorial tort principle”, Germany vs. Italy, paras 62-78. 
35 Definition of the state, see Art. 1 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States. 
36 In relation to the concept of state immunity, the term “state” includes the state and its 
various organs of government, such as ministers, diplomatic missions, and armed forces 
(see UN Convention, art 2(b). 
37 Crawford, 2012, p.487. 
38 Henriksen, 2017, p.103. 
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2.3  State  Immunity  and  Jus  Cogens  
Before discussing the relationship between state immunity and jus cogens, a 
few words will be mentioned about the relationship between the concept of 
jus cogens and human rights. A jus cogens norm is a norm accepted by the 
international community of states as a whole, as a superior norm of 
international law.39 Thus, jus cogens is a not a source of international law, 
but rather a trait that characterizes a small group of universally applicable 
rules of international customary law, as that part of international law which 
is not only binding on all states regardless of their consent, but which also 
permits no derogation. 40 Fundamental human rights, being regulated by 
customary international law and in treaties, many times also have the status 
of jus cogens. While it is uncertain what other human rights may fall under 
this category, it is established that among them are the protection against 
genocide, torture, enslavement, crimes against humanity and war crimes. 41 
A state that commits or permits any of these acts, violates international law, 
regardless of its relation to any human rights convention. Consequently, one 
may think that human rights of jus cogens status would have primacy over 
any other rules of international law, including the rules of state immunity.  
 
As have been explained above, there are some exceptions to state immunity, 
in cases of actions jure gestionis. However, it is less certain whether there 
exists an exception based on the status of jus cogens. In fact, an exception 
for civil claims for serious human rights violations was considered but not 
adopted in the UN Convention on Immunity, due to lack of consensus.42 
The relation between state immunity and jus cogens norms thus seem to be 
rather unclear. It was thoroughly discussed in Al-Adsani vs. United 
Kingdom43 decided by the European Court of Human rights. In this case, the 
                                               
39  On the concept of jus cogens, see article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.  
40 Linderfalk, 2012, p. 36. 
41 Linderfalk, 2012, p. 35. 
42 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1999, p. 172. 
43 Al-Adsani v. The United Kingdom, 2001. 
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court, by a slight 9-to-8 majority of the judges, concluded that the violation 
of the jus cogens norm on the prohibition of torture44 could not trigger an 
exception of state immunity in civil suits. However, in a joint dissenting 
opinion, six judges agreed that jus cogens norms superseded ordinary 
international rules, including the rules on state immunity.45 According to 
Caplan, this gave rise to the legal “normative hierarchy theory”, which 
holds that state immunity is void when serious human rights violations of 
jus cogens norms are concerned.46 More specifically, the normative theory 
stated that since the prohibition of torture, unlike the rule of state immunity, 
is a jus cogens norm, state immunity is not applicable in cases concerning 
serious human right violations.47  Similar arguments has also been supported 
in judgements from national courts.48 
 
To summarize, it is far from certain how to define the balance between jus 
cogens and state immunity. In 2012, the ICJ delivered a judgement which 
hopefully would bring some clarity on this matter. This judgement will be 
discussed in the following section. 
                                               
44 See art 3 ECHR, Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 
1950, ETS 5. 
45 Alebeek, 2012, p. 318. 
46 Caplan, 2003, p. 741, and Henriksen, 2017, p.118. 
47 Caplan, 2003, p.742. 
48 For practice in Italy, see Ferrini v Federal Republic of Germany, 2003. For practice in 
Greece, see prefecture of Voiotia v Federal Republic of Germany, 2000. 
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3  Germany  versus  Italy  
3.1    The  Facts  
The background of the case dates back to events occurring during the 
Second World War, when a large part of the Italian territory was occupied 
by Germany. The occupation resulted in a number of atrocious crimes 
committed by the German forces, such as massacres, deportations and 
enslavement. After the war, when the Italian victims brought civil claims 
against Germany in Italian courts to call for compensation,49 Germany 
challenged the proceedings with reference to jurisdictional immunity before 
foreign courts. In December 2008, Germany filed an application to the ICJ 
instituting proceedings against Italy alleging that Italy had failed to respect 
the jurisdictional immunity enjoyed by Germany under international law.50 
However, the Italian courts responded that jurisdictional immunity is not 
absolute, and that it should be set aside in cases of crimes under 
international law. 51 Italy’s main arguments were that Germany was not 
entitled to immunity since; (1) the acts involved the most serious crimes in 
international law, (2) which constituted breaches of jus cogens, (3) for 
which no alternative means of redress were available. 52 These arguments 
will be examined in the next section. 
 
                                               
49 See for example Ferrini v Federal Republic of Germany, 2003. 
50 Germany vs. Italy, para 1. 
51 Germany vs. Italy, paras 27-29. 
52 Germany vs. Italy, para 61. 
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3.2  The  Judgement  
3.2.1  The  Gravity  of  the  Violations  
The first question was whether the gravity of the violations could deprive 
Germany of the right to immunity. The court had to inquire if customary 
international law had developed to the point where a state is not entitled to 
immunity in case of serious violations of human rights law or the law of 
armed conflict. 53 It commenced by noting that Italian courts seemed to be 
the only national courts showing state practice in support of such an 
exception. In fact, the ICJ emphasized that there was a substantial body of 
state practice from other countries which demonstrated that customary 
international law did not treat a state’s entitlement to immunity as dependent 
upon the gravity of the act of which it was accused, or the peremptory 
nature of the rule which it had allegedly violated. 54 On the contrary, 
decisions from Canadian, French, Slovenian, and British courts had rejected 
similar arguments relating to human rights law and jus cogens violations. 55 
This was also supported by the examination of national legislation, the EU 
convention on immunity, and the UN convention on immunity.56 It should 
be noted, that it was not contested that the actions of the German armed 
forces constituted serious violations of the law of armed conflict, which 
amounted to crimes under international law. 57 However, these crimes were 
qualified by the ICJ as jure imperii, since a decision to employ a nation’s 
armed forces in an armed conflict constituted a typically sovereign act in the 
courts opinion. 58 The Court concluded that, under the current rules of 
customary international law, a state cannot be deprived of immunity merely 
                                               
53 Germany vs. Italy, para 83. 
54 Ibid, para 84. 
55 Ibid, para 85. 
56 Ibid. paras 88-89. 
57 Ibid. para 52. 
58 Ibid, para 60. See also Separate Opinion of Judge Koroma, “Jurisdictional Immunities of 
the State” (Germany vs. Italy), para 4. 
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because of the fact that it is accused of serious human rights violations of 
international law, or the international law of armed conflict.59  
 
3.2.2  Jus  Cogens  
Next, the ICJ turned to the argument that there was a conflict between jus 
cogens rules, forming part of the law of armed conflict on the one hand, and 
granting immunity on the other hand. Italy claimed that since jus cogens 
always prevail over any rule of international law, and since the rule of state 
immunity does not have the status of jus cogens, the rule of immunity must 
give way.60 However, the court did not recognize the existence of a conflict 
between jus cogens and the law of state immunity, since the two sets of 
rules address different matters. The rules of state immunity are procedural in 
character (in contrast to jus cogens which are substantive), and do not say 
anything about whether the actions are lawful or not. Recognizing the 
immunity of a foreign state in accordance with customary international law, 
is not the same as recognizing a breach of a jus cogens rule as lawful and 
cannot contravene the principle in article 41 of the International Law 
Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility61 (ILC Articles). 
Consequently, granting immunity cannot be considered as a breach of jus 
cogens according to article 40 of the ILC Articles. 62 
Although the ICJ acknowledged that a jus cogens rule is one from which no 
derogation is permitted, it emphasized that the rules determining the scope 
and extent of jurisdiction and when it may be exercised, does not breach the 
substantive rules which has jus cogens status.63 In fact, The ICJ have 
already taken that approach in two cases. In Armed Activities, it held that the 
fact that a rule has the status of jus cogens does not give the court a 
                                               
59 Germany vs. Italy, para 91. 
60 Ibid, para 92. 
61 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, November 2001, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1. 
62 Germany vs. Italy, para 93. 
63 Ibid, para 95. 
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jurisdiction which it would not otherwise possess.64 In Arrest Warrant, the 
court held, that the fact that a Minister for Foreign Affairs was accused of 
criminal violations of rules of jus cogens did not deny the state to demand 
immunity on his behalf.65 The Court considered that the same reasoning was 
applicable regarding the immunity of one state from proceedings in the 
courts of another. 66 In addition, the argument that jus cogens was displacing 
the law of State immunity, had been rejected by several national courts, such 
as the United Kingdom, Canada, Poland, Slovenia, New Zealand and 
Greece, as well as the European Court of Human Rights. An examination of 
the state’s national legislation pointed at the same conclusion.67 Thus, the 
ICJ concluded that even on the assumption that the proceedings in the 
Italian courts involved violations of jus cogens rules, the applicability of the 
customary international law on state immunity was not affected. 68 
 
3.2.3  The  Last  Resort  Argument  
Italy also defended a denial of immunity on the basis that Italian Courts 
were the last resort for the victims.69 The Italian courts wanted to allow 
certain categories of Italian victims, who were unable to obtain effective 
reparations for crimes committed by Germany, to have an alternative means 
of redress.70 The ICJ could not accept Italy’s argument that the fact that 
Germany had failed to compensate the Italian victims entitled the Italian 
courts to deprive Germany of jurisdictional immunity. The Court could not 
find any basis in the state practice, that international law makes state 
immunity dependent upon the existence of an effective way of securing 
redress. Neither in the national legislation on the subject, nor in the 
jurisprudence of the national courts which have been faced with objections 
                                               
64 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, 2006, paras. 64, 125. 
65 Arrest Warrant, 2002, paras. 58, 78. 
66 Germany vs. Italy, para 95. 
67 Ibid, para 96. 
68 Ibid, para 97. 
69 Ibid, para 98. 
70 Ibid, para 99, see also para 26. 
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based on immunity, was there any evidence that entitlement to immunity is 
subjected to such a precondition.71 Similarly, such a condition did not exist 
in the EU Convention or the UN Convention.72 The ICJ therefore rejected 
Italy’s argument that there was a “last resort” exception to state immunity.73  
To summarize, Italy lost on all aspects.74 By twelve votes to three, the court 
found that Italy had violated its obligations under international law to 
respect Germany’s state immunity, by allowing civil claims to be brought 
against it, based on violations of international humanitarian law committed 
by Germany between 1943 and 1945.75 The court ordered Italy to ensure 
that all decisions of its courts (and other judicial authorities) infringing 
Germany’s sovereign immunity, should cease to have effect, either by 
enacting appropriate legislation or by any other ways of its own choosing. 76  
 
                                               
71Germany vs. Italy, para 101. 
72 Ibid, para 101. 
73 Ibid, para 103. 
74 Ibid, para 107. 
75 Ibid, para 139 (1). 
76 Ibid, para 139 (4). 
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4  Criticism  of  the  Current  
Provisions  
4.1  The  Separate  and  Dissenting  Opinions  
This section will examine the separate and dissenting opinions in Germany 
vs. Italy. Thereafter follows an examination of selected critical contributions 
in the legal doctrine, and a brief summary of the Italian Constitutional 
Courts response to the ICJ’s judgement.  
 
The separate opinion of judge Bennouna dismissed the majority’s opinion 
that there existed no conflict between rules of jus cogens and rules of state 
immunity. Contrary, he argued that the question of jurisdictional immunity 
raises fundamental ethical and juridical problems, “which cannot be evaded 
simply by characterizing immunity as a simple matter of procedure.”77 
Instead, in order to rule on the issue of immunity, and on the arguments for 
lifting immunity put forward by the claimant, the court has to examine the 
merits of the case.78 Thus, Bennouna dismisses the argument that immunity 
rules are preliminary rules. Furthermore, Judge Bennouna argued that a state 
should face the risk of losing the benefit of its immunity before the courts of 
the forum state, in exceptional circumstances, when the state rejects any 
engagement of its responsibility for the crimes. In such cases, the victims’ 
rights to have access to justice in their own country, would then be 
prioritized, if the state in question had refused to submit to the fundamental 
principles of law. 79 This is motivated by the need to maintain the rule of 
law. According to Bennonuna, the rule of law at the international level 
serves, inter alia, to discourage state leaders, from engaging in violations of 
                                               
77 Separate Opinion of judge Bennouna, Germany vs Italy, para 9. 
78 Ibid, para 29. 
79 Ibid, para 15. 
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peremptory norms of law relating to the prevention of international crimes.80 
Thus, if the merits of the case in crimes relating to human rights violations 
should be ignored because of state immunity, it could open the door to 
abuses with the potential to undermine the very foundations of international 
legality. 81 
 
In the dissenting opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade it was held, contrary to 
the majority’s opinion, that jus cogens indeed removes any bar to 
jurisdiction, for the purpose of achieving reparation to the victims. 82 
Accordingly, 
 
“[t]here can be no prerogative or privilege of State immunity in cases of international 
crimes, […]: these are grave breaches of absolute prohibitions of jus cogens, for which 
there can be no immunities.”83  
 
Thus, in Trinidades opinion, the grave breaches of human rights and of 
international humanitarian law described in Germany vs. Italy, amount to 
breaches of jus cogens, which triggers state responsibility and the right to 
reparation of the victims.84 Therefore, the need for redress for the victims 
should be the main priority, and states should be held accountable for their 
crimes. Indeed, he maintains that “[s]tate atrocities are not to be covered up 
by the shield of State immunity.”85 Hardly surprising, Trindade also rejected 
the argument of the ICJ that there existed no conflict between procedural 
and substantive rules. Instead, he claimed that there obviously existed a 
conflict between the two rules, and that ignoring this conflict would result in 
depriving jus cogens of its effects and legal consequences.86  
 
                                               
80 Separate Opinion of judge Bennouna, Germany vs Italy, para 35. 
81 Ibid, para 16. 
82 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, Jurisdictional Immunities of the state 
(Germany vs. Italy), para 303. 
83 Ibid, para 315. 
84 Ibid, para 313. 
85 Ibid, para 303. 
86 Ibid, para 315. 
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Moreover, Trinidade rejected the distinction between acts jure imperii and 
acts jure gestionis, as being inadequate to the examination of war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. These actions “[…] are not to be considered 
acta jure gestionis, or else “private acts”; they are crimes. They are not to be 
considered acta jure imperii either; they are grave delicta, crimes.”87 Thus, 
this distinction could not be applied in relation to breaches of jus cogens. 
 
In the separate opinion of judge Koroma, it is held that the ICJ applied the 
law correctly as it exists today, but that new exceptions to state immunity 
may continue to develop in the future. 88  
 
4.2  The  Legal  Doctrine    
The idea that there should be an exception to state immunity in cases of 
serious human rights violations has been argued by several scholars. 
Reimann claims that an exception to state immunity in cases of serious 
human rights violations is of importance in order to give individuals access 
to justice. Indeed, in most cases, actions against individual perpetrators are 
useless, since they often are unidentifiable or dead. Thus, the victim's only 
hope for redress is generally to sue the foreign state itself.89 Because of this, 
Reimann means that it is about time to establish a denial of state immunity 
for certain, particularly horrendous crimes. In his opinion, this would also 
be consonant with the developments that have dominated international law 
subsequently to the second world war; a more restrictive state immunity, 
and a more extensive human rights protection. 90 State immunity should not 
be granted unconditionally. Instead, states should be obliged to fulfill at 
least the most fundamental obligations of the international community in 
order to enjoy state immunity. Indeed, Reimann notes that, “[i]t makes no 
sense to recognize unconditionally binding norms of international law and at 
                                               
87 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, Germany vs. Italy, para 178. 
88 Separate Opinon judge Koroma, Germany vs. Italy, para 7. 
89 Reimann, 1995, p. 405. 
90 Reimann, 1995, p. 406. 
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the same time to shield perpetrators who violate these norms from legal 
action.”91 In accordance with this argument, Ekpo holds that, since there is a 
legal obligation to ensure and secure human rights of individuals under 
international law92, prosecution of human rights crimes should have primacy 
over the doctrine of state immunity.93  
Another interesting criticism is that the immunities of states in relation to 
jus cogens creates an inconsistency with immunity rules in criminal 
proceedings. This criticism is being lifted by Bianchi. He compared the 
scope of state immunity with the 1998 Pinochet case94 in the House of Lords 
(which was a criminal proceeding), and concluded that, while states and 
state representatives would continue to be held immune in civil proceedings 
for acts of torture and other crimes of international law, as regards criminal 
proceedings they might be prosecuted, and no plea of immunity might be 
available to them. According to Bianchi, this creates an undesirable 
inconsistency which ought to be remedied by denying immunity also to 
states and state officials in civil proceedings. 95 Furthermore, Bianchi seems 
to support the ideas put forward by the normative hierarchy theory, stating 
that the “reliance on the hierarchy of norms in the international legal system 
is a viable argument to assert non-immunity for major violations of 
international human rights.” 96  
In line with the view set out in the separate opinion of judge Koroma briefly 
mentioned above, Henriksen considers the tension between state immunity 
and jus cogens to constitute one part of the law of state immunity that may 
change in the future.97 
                                               
91 Reimann, 1995, p. 423. 
92 Art 2(1) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, art 2(1), and art 1 
European Convention on Human Rights.  
93 Ekpo, 2017, p.154. 
94 Pinochet, 25th November 1998, House of Lords. 
95 Bianchi, 1999, p. 264. 
96 Bianchi, 1994, p. 219.  
97 Henriksen, 2017, p.109. 
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4.3  Judgement  no.  238  
As was stated above, the ICJ asserted that Italy had to, for example by 
passing appropriate laws, ensure that the decisions of its courts no longer 
infringed the German immunity.98 Thus, the Italian legislator passed a law 
ratifying the UN Convention, and by doing so, it provided a statutory basis 
for the judicial implementation of Germany vs Italy. Consequently, final 
judgments could be challenged if conflicting with an ICJ judgment barring 
Italy from exercising jurisdiction.99 However, two years after Germany vs. 
Italy, the Italian Constitutional Court (CC) delivered the judgement no. 238, 
where it refused to give effect to the judgement of the ICJ.100 The legal 
arguments behind this decision was that the customary regime on state 
immunity (in the scope defined by the ICJ) was incompatible with articles 2 
and 24 of the Italian Constitution.101  The CC meant that both article 2 – 
which provides a recognition of the fundamental rights of every human 
being, and article 24 – which provides the right to judicial protection – 
would have been unlawfully sacrificed as a result of an implementation of 
the ICJ judgement. 102 
 
In the judgement no. 238, the CC did not agree with the argument of the ICJ 
that state immunity, being a procedural rule, could prevent the Italian court 
from examining the claims against another state, even in the case of a 
peremptory norm being relevant to the merits. In accordance with the 
separate opinion of judge Bennouna103, the CC asserted that an objection 
concerning jurisdiction, necessarily required an examination of the 
arguments put forward in the claims of the parties.104 The CC furthermore 
held that a state immunity without any exceptions, would be depriving the 
victims of their rights to obtain redress. This, the CC concluded, would 
                                               
98 Germany vs. Italy, para 137. 
99 Fontanelli, 2014. 
100 Judgement no. 238, 2014. para 5.1. 
101 De Sena, 2016, pp. 99–101. 
102 Judgement no 238, 2014, para 3.4. 
103 See above, section 4.1. 
104 Judgement no 238, 2014, para 2.2.
 25 
constitute a breach of the fundamental principles in articles 2 and 24 in the 
Italian Constitution.105 Here, a parallel can be drawn to the dissenting 
opinion of judge Trinidade, also giving priority to the need for redress.  
 
Regarding the balance between state immunity and jus cogens, they saw no 
need to balance the two principles at all; war crimes and crimes against 
humanity simply could not qualify as acts jure imperii, as that would have 
the outcome that states could commit serious human rights violations 
without breaking the law. In the Court’s opinion, state immunity is not 
intended to cover these types of actions, since: 
“It [state immunity] does not protect behaviors that do not represent the typical exercise of 
governmental powers, but are explicitly considered and qualified unlawful, since they are in 
breach of inviolable rights, as was recognized, in the present case, by the ICJ itself, (…)”106 
To summarize, the reasoning of the CC ultimately came down to the 
argument that international crimes of jus cogens cannot qualify as acts jure 
imperii. The main distinction from the arguments brought before the ICJ 
was that, this time, the CC merely defined the application of Italian law, 
(not customary international law), on state immunity. According to the 2016 
Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Italy seems to continue to 
uphold its case law on war crimes and state immunity from jurisdiction in 
line with Judgement no. 238. 107 
 
                                               
105 Judgement no 238, 2014, para 3.4. 
106 Ibid, para 3.4. 
107 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, 2016, p. 24. 
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5  Analysis  
5.1  The  Balance  Between  the  Rules    
The purpose of this paper has been to investigate and problematize the 
balance between state immunity and human rights violations of jus cogens 
status in international law. The examination of the concept of state 
immunity has showed that the conflict originally emanates from the tension 
between two fundamental principles of public international law; the 
principle of sovereign equality and the principle of territorial sovereignty. 
Exceptions to state immunity represents a departure from the principle of 
sovereign equality, while the granting of state immunity may represent a 
departure from the principle of territorial sovereignty, and the adjudicative 
jurisdiction which flows from it. Thus, state immunity exists as an exception 
to the overriding principle of adjudicatory jurisdiction stemming from 
territorial sovereignty. In cases regarding crimes against jus cogens norms, 
additional interests are being placed on the scales, rendering the tension 
even more delicate.  
 
As was confirmed by the discussion of the ICJ in Germany vs. Italy, it can 
be concluded that all sovereign (imperii) acts committed by a state is 
protected by state immunity. This is regardless of the gravity of the breach, 
or the fact that the act constitutes a breach of jus cogens. All acts ordered by 
a state, which are not purely commercial, fall within the qualification jure 
imperii. A state cannot be sued in a civil suit for ordering massacres, torture 
and other crimes of jus cogens status: there exists no exception from state 
immunity in cases of breaches of jus cogens norms. From a rational point of 
view, this conclusion appears to be quite reasonable to me. At least if one 
examines the relevant practice from the perspective of the formation process 
of a specific exception in customary international law to the traditional rule 
on state immunity. But In accordance with for example Reimann, judge 
Bennouna and judge Trinidade, I nevertheless find it hard to accept that 
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victims of war crimes and serious human rights violations will be rejected to 
bring their cases in front of a court. Yet, this is what the law is. What the 
law should be is another story. Since the rule of sovereign immunity is 
neither a matter of jus cogens nor provided by treaty, it is simply a rule of 
customary international law. And like all such law, it is not cast in stone. 
Instead, it is somewhat ever-changing in two ways. First, its substance and 
shapes are not exact to begin with, and therefore there is room for debate 
about its scope. Second, it is subject to a constant development and 
modification, which has been illustrated for example by the movement from 
the absolute doctrine to the restrictive immunity in the end of the nineteenth 
century. One should be reminded that this movement was created by 
decisions from national courts, unwilling to accept the prevalent scope of 
state immunity. From this perspective, it is possible that such a movement 
might emerge once again, and even, that the CC’s judgement constitutes the 
beginning of a development in that direction. Thus, although the balance 
between the rules of state immunity and jus cogens appears to weigh in 
favor of state immunity, this might change in the future. State immunity 
seems to be a matter of changing practice, of degree, and of argument. 
 
5.2  The  Arguments  Behind  the  Balance  
The second question in this paper regarded the arguments behind the 
balance between state immunity and jus cogens. From the examination of 
the criticism of the current provisions there can, in my opinion, be 
distinguished three types of main arguments of a balance in favor of jus 
cogens. These are; the normative hierarchy argument (state immunity is 
void when serious human rights violations of jus cogens norms are 
concerned), the “qualification” argument (crimes of jus cogens cannot be 
qualified as sovereign acts), and the redress argument (breaches of jus 
cogens triggers state responsibility state responsibility and the right to 
reparation of the victims). The tendency in public international law against a 
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more extensive human rights protection might further strengthen these 
arguments in the future.  
 
On the other side of the scales, the ICJ has concluded that there is no basis 
in international customary law, that makes state immunity dependent upon 
the existence of an effective way of securing redress, or the gravity of a 
violation. Even more importantly, the main argument of a balance in favor 
of state immunity seems to be that since the rules of state immunity and jus 
cogens are of different characters, they can never be in conflict with each 
other. Instead, the rules of state immunity have to be applied preliminary. I 
do not agree with the ICJ that there exists is no conflict between jus cogens 
and state immunity. If it is true, on the one hand, that customary law has not 
developed to the point where there is an exception to state immunity in 
cases of serious violations of international human rights law or the 
international law of armed conflict, it should also be true, on the other hand, 
that both the rule on state immunity and the legal regime for serious 
violations of human rights constitutes two conflicting, fundamental 
principles of international law: i.e., the sovereign equality of states and the 
protection of inviolable human rights. Thus, I believe that the balance 
between state immunity and jus cogens may have to be reassessed again in 
the future.  
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